Introduction
In this paper, I seek to explore the differences between Modern Standard Arabic (MSA hereafter) and the Iraqi dialect, with particular preference given to lexical borrowing and morphosyntactic variation. Beginning with the expansion of Islam from the Arabian Peninsula, moving to the foundation of Baghdad and its importance as a center of linguistic prestige, and continuing to the history of successive conquests and colonial occupations, I intend to show that the variety of Arabic spoken in modern-day Iraq differs substantially from MSA, and that this variation has occurred since the early Baghdadi grammarians first began to document the grammar of Classical Arabic (CLA hereafter). I intend to support the hypothesis of Holes (2004) and several other Arabic scholars who contend that Second Language Acquisition, and not pidginization, is the more likely explanation for how the Arabic language was promulgated over successive centuries among the disparate tribes and communities of practice that came to comprise the modern-day nation of Iraq.

The spread of the Arabic language from the Arabian Peninsula during the 7th century A.D. is one of the most dynamic and impactful spreads of a language and culture in human history. While the initial path which this language travelled is well-understood by historians, the mechanism by which Arabic came to be adopted by disparate cultures and people-groups throughout the 8th and 9th centuries has been a subject of some conjecture. The two prevailing theories on its transmission to other cultures can be generally summarized as either a “pidginization” hypothesis or a Second Language Acquisition (SLA) hypothesis, both based on modern observations of how languages generally behave during a cultural interaction. According to the pidginization hypothesis, Najdi and Hejazi speakers from the Peninsula likely would have encountered speakers of other languages and cultures as they expanded outward, and due to the rapid nature of the cultural contact it may have been necessary for speakers of diverse languages to devise a rudimentary method of communication. From a sociolinguistic perspective, pidgins tend to form in cases of limited or incidental cultural interaction, as in a situation of international trade or first contact between native cultures and outside explorers. One of the hallmarks of a situation where pidgins are created is a mutual lack of trust or understanding on the part of the cultures. This is exemplified by the evolution of such Creoles (a pidgin which has acquired native speakers over successive generations) as those developed in the Caribbean as a result of the slave trade.

The more likely theory, in my opinion, is that of Second Language Acquisition. SLA is a more likely hypothesis because it does not necessitate a phonological or grammatical leveling, as usually witnessed in cases of pidginization, and allows for the retention of complex grammatical and morphosyntactic structures as cultures gradually learn to speak one another’s language over time. This is consistent with much of the phonological and lexical diversity, and yet the relative morphosyntactic similarity, seen within the spoken dialects of Iraq and the Gulf as compared to the more conservative features of MSA. Iraq in particular is a country with a rich linguistic history; with the establishment of Baghdad as capital of the Abbasid Caliphate circa the 750s A.D., Iraq became a major center of prestige and cultural interaction for roughly the next five centuries. Subsequently, the Mongols, Turks, and eventually the British and other colonial powers became dominant over the region, and continual linguistic interactions took place between Persian and Arabic-speaking Shia populations. This abundance of linguistic influences has led to a very rich phonological (as with the addition of [ʧ], [g], [p], and [v] to the phonological stock) and lexical diversity within the dialect, however overall it remains mostly true to form with the grammatical conventions of CLA/MSA. Over the centuries, Iraqi has incorporated numerous phonological and lexical features from these languages while usually (with some notable exceptions) retaining the grammatical forms imposed by Arabic as it took root from the 7th to the 9th centuries.

Literature Review
Fischer (2006) introduces general issues in morphosyntactic change, including what constitutes good practice in historical linguistics. In defining principles, mechanisms, and causes of change, she sets forth both the Principles and Parameters model and the Grammaticalization model as her primary vehicles to describe diachronic change. She then presents a series of case studies providing illustrative examples.

Meisel et al (2013) and many others have put forth the theory that child language acquisition is the likely locus for many of the changes which occur within a language (Meisel, pp. 52-72). A significant body of research points to the soundness of children’s grammatical acquisition even in the absence of complete exposure (Chomsky’s poverty of the stimulus) to a language; nevertheless structural ambiguities and language contact resulting in conflicting inputs for a child learner have been proposed as two of the most salient factors in diachronic change (Meisel, p.64). As stated by Alqassas (p.89-94), the categories of language which exhibit more syntactic and morphological complexity tend to be more vulnerable to simplification or outright suppression, such as case endings, relative pronouns, subordinate clauses, etc. whereas more resilient categories such as complementizers and noun-verbal agreements tend to persist even among heritage speakers whose comprehensible input is likely to be much lower than a child learning in their country of origin. This assertion is supported by Silva-Corvalan (2016), wherein she examined the productive capabilities of heritage Spanish learners raised in the United States. Silva-Corvalan found that increased object clitic omissions and increased use of subject pronouns accompanied by a decreased strength of coreferentiality constraint were systemic among children aged six and below whose limited exposure to Spanish led to incomplete acquisition of these more-complex syntactic features (Silva-Corvalan, pp.6-9). Though Silva-Corvalan was not articulating the concept of “vulnerability” per se, there is an emerging body of evidence to make the case for certain linguistic categories being more resilient while others seem far more difficult to acquire and retain, particularly in an environment where the Language Alpha is only practiced at home. This in turn lends some credence to the overall hypothesis of Second Language Acquisition as the major vehicle for the spread of Arabic, wherein it is highly likely that the Language Alpha in conquered Muslim lands was spoken in the homes of non-Arabs and therefore influenced the acquisition process of successive generations of Arabic learners.

Holes (2004) asserts that, “The morphological structure of the Arabic dialects as a whole is simpler than that of CLA/MSA in the sense that there are fewer separate categories. In the verb, some morphosemantic patterns have been lost...In inflectional morphology, a number of categories have disappeared completely.” (Holes, pp.117-118) He goes on to illustrate that low-frequency, marked categories were by far the most vulnerable to loss. In morphosyntax, the functional load of vowel patterns have generally been reduced and uses of particles and affixes have increased to compensate for the loss. (Holes, p.123) According to Holes’ (Chapter 8) and Bassiouney’s (Al-Wer and De Jong pp. 273-284) articulation of the various intermediary levels between “pure” MSA and “pure” dialect, many of the borrowed words and grammatical features (as articulated by Holes p.307) in the Iraqi dialect retain the phonological and occasionally syntactic features of their original language.

Conversely, Trudgill, in Al-Wer and De Jong (2009), set forth the assertion that while many linguists believe simplification to be the natural result of language contact, there is also a significant and emerging body of evidence in favor of complexification as an equally likely result (Al-Wer & De Jong, 2009 pp. 173-185). Trudgill proposes that, in cases where simplification occurs, it is likely the nature of the language contact was more brief, whereas in cases of complexification it was likely more protracted (p.177). Al-Essa (Al-Wer & De Jong 2009, pp. 203-222) also discusses the dialect leveling which likely took place in Jeddah as a result of extended contact between speakers of the Najdi and Hejazi dialects, and Ingham (Al-Wer and De Jong, pp. 99-108) examines the dialect of the Euphrates Bedouin tribes, demonstrating that they shared certain features of both the urban Baghdadi dialect and several features of the much-older Najdi dialect as studied by him in Ingham (1994). All of these illustrate the complex nature of language interaction which allows for both complexification and simplification to occur simultaneously.

Talmon (2003) provides excellent examinations of the historical texts of the CLA gammarians. Their early attempts to standardize and codify the grammar of 8th-century Arabic, specifically comparing the “Old Iraqi School” and Halil and Sibawayhi’s later reformations, allows us to see the progression of development within the communities of practice in 8th century Baghdad and Basra. Talmon provides excerpts and analyses from many of the earliest grammarians, from ‘Isa Bin ‘Ummar and Yunus Bin Habib to Halil Bin Ahmad and later reformers such as Sibawayhi. Talmon examines Halil’s selection of functional terminology and his systematic attempts to explain grammatical features which were extant at the time. Taken alongside Ingham’s (1994) work, this volume allows for comparison between the Arabic codified by the Classicists and, when compared with the features of Najdi, allows us to make the case that the Arabic language was diglossic in nature from its earliest days as a codified linguistic system.

Salih J. Altoma’s The problem of diglossia in Arabic offers phonological, lexical, and syntactic comparisons between MSA and Iraqi. Of particular value is Altoma’s articulation of the formation of composite morphemes, such as [š-] and [-eyš] used as interrogatives. Altoma notes that [š-] can occur as a prefix to verbs, nouns, and particles, whereas [-eyš] can only occur as a suffix to nouns and particles. He also notes the use of [man] in Iraqi takes on the characteristics of a suffix to particles and nouns, i.e. [haða kitaabman] for “who’s book is this?” (Altoma, p.91); whereas [minuu], a likely elision of [man huwa], is the preferred interrogative particle for “who.” With regard to lexical comparison, Altoma provides an entire chapter on loanwords and their origins, some with complex or even unknown etymologies which may be a synthesis of multiple languages, such as [balaakit] for “but,” which Altoma hypothesizes may be a fusion of two particles, or was derived from [balki] for “perhaps,” of Turkish origin (Altoma, p.99).

Muller-Kessler (2003) also theorizes that Aramaic (specifically referencing examples from Babylonian Talmudic Aramaic texts and Folmer’s 1995 study of Achaemenid Aramaic) likely contributed its particle of existence [yk] and its negative equivalent [lyk] to the koine dialects of the surrounding Mesopotamian region (Mueller-Kessler, p.624-643), which gradually became [ekko] or [ekka] per later inscriptions. She contends this has survived in present times as the particles [aakuu] and [maakuu]. Mueller-Kessler addresses dissenting opinions by fellow Arabic/Aramaic scholars by demonstrating that similar inscriptions in contemporary Syraic Aramaic artefacts show no use of the Mesopotamian particles, and the modern use of the particles is still highly regionally localized (Mueller-Kessler, p. 645).

Specific Examples
According to Georgetown’s A Dictionary of Iraqi Arabic, there are numerous examples of both borrowed verbs and nouns which have adopted the morphological rules of the assimilating language; specifically I intend to highlight the influence of British English on car-related vocabulary. The verbs [pnʧr] and [prk] as applied to automobiles are borrowed directly from British English as a result of the period under which Iraq was ruled as a British mandate from 1920-1932, when automobiles first became widespread within the region. These verbs conform to the standard inflectional and derivational forms of Arabic morphology as illustrated by phrases such as [anii ʧnt atparak siyarti hun], i.e. “I used to park my car here.” Or, for another example [pnʧrt siyarti], meaning either “my car got a flat (tire),” or, “my car broke down,” thus generalizing the meaning to include any mechanical failure; which exhibits the type of polysemy often encountered when words are borrowed as in a pidgin. Likewise with nouns, the word [dašbuul] refers to the dashboard of the car, and [steern] refers to the steering wheel, as well as [sipring] “spring,” aka the car suspension, and [speer], the “spare” car tire. All of these nouns follow the regular [-aat] plural format [dašbuulaat], [steernaat], [sipringaat], and [speeraat], respectively. These all provide excellent support to the Behnstedt chapter Words and Things (Al-Wer and De Jong, pp.63-75), wherein borrowed words often tell a great deal about the technologies brought by foreign occupiers. Specifically, Behnstedt illustrates the different rates of use for words like “Forno” versus the more native [tabuun] to describe an oven, and even to denote the specific style of an oven’s construction in places where both kinds are in more or less widespread use (pp. 69-71). Iraqi is also famous for its use of the adjective /xooš/, a Turkish loanword meaning “good,” however the adjective does not conform to the standard N-A construct which is otherwise used uniformly in Arabic. Instead, if for example an Iraqi speaker wanted to say “good idea,” s/he would say /xoš fikra/ in conformity with Turkish A-N grammar (Clarity, B. E. 2003: 148), instead of the more commonly-used /fikra zayna/ attested elsewhere throughout the Levant. Notably, this illustrates a case of both borrowed syntax and simplified gender construct, as the adjective is used in the same manner regardless of whether the noun is masculine or feminine.

With regard to Modality, Iraqi generally suppresses case endings like all spoken dialects (Holes, p.226), and tends to rely more on the use of [xaaf] either at the outset of an utterance or preceding a verb to indicate a subjunctive mood. The particle [qad] is also used to a certain extent, as evidenced by utterances attested by Holes (p.234) [qad ʔakuunu wasˁaltu baʕda yawmayni], which to my admittedly-foreign ear sounds more proper than the second example [saʔakuunu qad wasˁaltu] based on past experience. The relation between expressions of epistemic uncertainty in Iraqi and MSA, particularly the Iraqi retention of [qad] as a particle expressing possibility despite the fact that [xaaf] is more preferred (Nydell, M. K. 1991), seems to me to indicate that the underlying grammar of MSA remains robust in spite of newer additions to the language. This is further supported by Ingham’s chapter on the Rufai’, Ahl al-Shimal, and ħumaid Bedouin tribes of the Northern Najdi/Mesopotamian regions whose morphological features essentially “split the difference” between traditional Najdi and the Southern Iraq region (Al-Wer & De Jong, p. 101).

Tense generally follows CLA/MSA conventions, although the imperfect is often marked by the preverbal morpheme [daa] to form a present progressive, as in [ʔanii daaštuɣul mutariʤim] i.e. “I am working as a translator.” As articulated by Holes (p.232-238), there are several particles and auxiliary verbs (notably [kaana], or [ʧaan] in Iraqi) which denote the past tense clearly, although like MSA the use of the auxiliary verb denotes primarily habitual past actions whereas the simple past is denoted with the traditional suffixes (usually with a final sukuun). Negation almost categorically favors the use of [maa] in Iraqi, as attested by numerous examples in Owens et al (2009, ch.2) and Holes (p. 239-245), where a verbal predicate is negated by an immediately preverbal [maa] (Holes p. 243), however unlike other dialects Iraqi does not use circumfixal negation with a final [š].

Regarding word order and phrase structure, Iraqi examples cited in Owens et al (2009, ch.2) indicate that while V-S sentences predominate most narrative descriptions, utterances 13-16 (p.65) illustrate that even in narrative use in mononodal sentences there is a pragmatic application for fronting a subject. Similarly, utterances 17-23 (pp.66-67) show further use of the focus-fronting feature whereby new information is introduced or a subject is expounded upon for emphasis. This topic marking via dislocation (or extraposition, as Holes calls it) is exemplified by utterances 13, 14, and 16 in Owens et al Ch. 2., as well as the use of resumptive pronouns. Ingham (1994) also found numerous instances of focus-fronting a subject in the Najdi dialects spoken in the regions spanning from the Peninsula up into the Southern deserts of Iraq. Because Ingham’s informants represent some of the most isolated and conservative speakers of the dialect (Ingham, 1994: 5-7), his conclusions regarding the age and prevalence of mononodal and binodal sentence constructs in Najdi may be used to infer that it was Najdi which contributed this feature to the Baghdadi/Iraqi dialects (Al-Wer and De Jong, pp. 99-108). This is also discussed in the Palva reading, wherein a kind of Bedoinization of the Baghdadi dialect took place in the wake of the devastation and resettlement of the city following the Mongol invasions (Al-Wer and De Jong, pp. 29-33).

 While Palva (Al-Wer& De Jong, pp.17-40), for example, attests the existence of variations of the word [rɑħ] such as [lɑħ] and [ɣɑħ], I have yet to encounter these particles in any of the translation work I have done in my ten years of experience. Admittedly the flight of minority Christian and Jewish populations from Iraq in the wake of the 2003 US invasion has likely played a significant factor.

Verbal nouns appear to remain consistent with the morphological patterns laid out by Holes (pp. 146-149), although there are several cases which, anecdotally, I have seen the noun of instance used polysemously in place of the traditional verbal noun. For example, the use of [dˁrba] in context could mean “a hit,” or the act of hitting itself, i.e. [ðˁrbat ʔalmadrasa ʧaant ʕiib] (Iraqi phonology commonly substitutes a [ðˁ] in place of a [dˁ]). Active participles in Iraqi take on a very different appearance from their use in any neighboring dialect. Here we find an example of lexical borrowing from neighboring Persian, where the word [ʧii] is appended to essentially any noun or verb to make an active participle of it, i.e. [ʧaaii ʧii] would be one who serves tea, [panʧaarʧii] would be one who repairs cars, etc. Passive participles behave in the same predictable patterns as verbal nouns, marked again by word-initial and word-final vowel suppression.
Nouns of instance generally take a taa marbouta in conformity with CLA/MSA morphosyntactic norms, however there are cases such as the Iraqi [kabraan], [samnaan], and [ðablaan] examples cited in Holes (p. 158) and the Egyptian [ʔarfaan], [dafyaan], and [ʕayaan] (p.159) which indicate an expansion of pattern usage from CLA/MSA. Nouns of place in Iraqi diverge more widely than other dialects from MSA, due once again to an instance of lexical borrowing from Persian. Here, the word [xaana] is appended to any noun or verb to make a noun of place. For instance, a gas station in Iraqi is commonly known as a [banziin xaana], a coffee (or tea) shop is known as a [ʧaaii xaana], etc. Diminutives abide by standard MSA conventions, although vowels are usually flattened to conform more to the phonological preferences of the Iraqi palate, which also widely favors affrication of velar plosives. Gender inflections in Iraqi are denoted, in the feminine case, by the substitution of a [ʧ] in place of a [k], thereby eliminating the need for vowel-based gender marking. Any feminine possessive can be denoted in this way, i.e. [siyartiʧ] as opposed to [siyartik] for a feminine possessor of a car vs. a masculine one. This affrication of the [k], as well as a de-affrication of [ts] and [dz] among Najdi speakers is examined at length by Al-Essa (Al-Wer and De Jong, pp. 203-222) where she catalogues instances of dialect leveling in the Najdi and Hejazi variations found to have extended contact in Jeddah.

Conclusion
            Meisel et al (2013) articulated the following:

Iraqi is a particularly eclectic variety of Arabic, incorporating lexical and morphosyntactic features from CLA/MSA, Mesopotamian languages which were extant prior to the arrival of Arabic, as well as Persian and Turkish. Due to the extensive nature of the variation, it is highly unlikely that these nuances would have survived a process of pidginization, creolization, and de-creolization. Further, the rural Bedouin informants whose morphosyntactic features predate modern Iraqi make the case that the grammar system has remained more or less stable over the centuries. The lexical and even structural borrowing which has taken place over successive centuries can be demonstrably attributed to extended language contact, further supporting SLA and complexification theories put forth by Holes and Trudgill.
 
Bibliography

• Holes, C., 1948. (2004). Modern arabic: Structures, functions, and varieties (Rev. ed.). Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press.
• Al-Wer, E., De Jong, R. E., & Holes, C. (2009). Arabic Dialectology: In honour of Clive Holes on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Leiden: Brill.
• Ingham, B. Najdi Arabic : Central Arabian, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1994. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=739959.
• Alqassas, A. (2015). Negation, tense and NPIs in jordanian arabic. Lingua: International Review of General Linguistics, 156, 101-128. doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2014.12.010
• Silva-Corvalan, C. (2016). Simultaneous bilingualism: Early developments, incomplete later outcomes? International Journal of Bilingualism, doi:10.1177/1367006916652061.
• Fischer, O. (2006) Morphosyntactic Change : Functional and Formal Perspectives, OUP Oxford, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=415552.
• Altoma, S. J. (1969). The Problem of Diglossia in Arabic: A Comparative Study of Classical and Iraqi Arabic. Cambridge, Mass: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press.
• Csató, É. Á., et al. (2014) Linguistic Convergence and Areal Diffusion : Case Studies from Iranian, Semitic and Turkic, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=199400.
• Meisel, J. M., Elsig, M., & Rinke, E. (2013). Language Acquisition and Change: A Morphosyntactic Perspective. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Nydell, M. K. (Margaret Kleffner). (1991). From Modern Standard Arabic to the Iraqi Dialect: Conversion Course. Arlington, Va: DLS Press.
• Muller-Kessler, C. (2003). Aramaic 'k', lyk' and Iraqi Arabic 'aku, maku: The Mesopotamian Particles of Existence. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 123(3), 641-646. Retrieved from http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/217141532?accountid=11091.
• Talmon, R. (2003). Eighth-Century Iraqi Grammar: A Critical Exploration of Pre-ḩalīlian Arabic Linguistics. Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns.
• Clarity, B. E. (2003). A Dictionary of Iraqi Arabic: English-Arabic, Arabic-English. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press.
• Wehr, H., 1909, & Cowan, J. M. (1994). A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: Arabic-English(4th ed.). Ithaca, N.Y: Spoken Language Services.

In this paper, I seek to recreate Elizabeth Anderson’s argument as she examines the role of employers as a kind of private government which is accountable to little or no outside oversight. Ultimately, I will agree with her that employers can and often do wield undue influence over the lives of their employees in a way that is undemocratic and in need of reform. I will then defend this assertion from possible counter-arguments.

Anderson explores government as defined by “the authority to issue orders to others, backed by sanctions, in one or more domains of life (p. 97).” More broadly, any system of carrots and sticks (i.e. positive and negative incentives) which can be used to compel or coerce obedience from others may be considered a form of government. Anderson then goes on to define what is meant by her use of the word “private,” namely that she is not referring to the traditional understandings of a “public sector” and “private sector” where all things civil government are considered public and all things commercial are considered private. Rather, on Anderson’s account privacy in this case refers to a lack of transparency or accountability on the part of those issuing orders. In essence, Anderson’s account of private government is any system which wields control over the life of its subjects where said subjects are denied any say in what orders are issued or any input regarding the protection of their own interests. By this definition, she contends, all workplace supervisors are essentially autocratic dictators.

Next, Anderson goes on to elucidate the three kinds of freedom which she sees as being distinct and essential: negative, positive, and republican freedom. Negative freedom means an absence of restriction or interference on one’s actions. Positive freedom means the availability of a rich selection of available options, and republican freedom means that no one is dominating you; you are not subject to anyone’s arbitrary and unaccountable will. Anderson points out that a person stranded on a desert island may have total negative and republican freedom, but would then lack positive freedom since there would be very little to do. Conversely, a favored member of a royal court may have abundant negative and positive freedom, but their ruler has the arbitrary ability to withdraw their favor at any time, prohibiting republican freedom. A successful democratic society may have abundant positive and republican freedom, but likely will not have a great deal of negative freedom, since there would be many complex regulations and restrictions on individual liberty.

Anderson then points out that it is often necessary to make trade-offs in various areas of these freedoms, for example total negative freedom would represent a state of anarchy, whereby anyone could take what anyone else owned with no intervention by any authority. The need for protection of property rights necessitates some state-imposed restriction on negative freedom, which in turn increases the share of positive and republican rights guaranteed to all.

Next, Anderson expounds on the emergence of the “Firm” as an economic structure. With the rise of the industrial revolution, employment was taken en masse from the home to outside places of production and manufacturing. This, in turn, led to the rise of “bosses,” or a managerial hierarchy, who were ostensibly intended to improve productivity by supervising and redirecting workers to ensure maximum cooperation and a minimum of waste. Since the complex nature of the production process continually grew, managers and supervisors were increasingly granted more sweeping authority to handle unforeseen circumstances. Coupled with the concept of at-will employment contracts, whereby a worker can be fired for any or no reason, this presented a set of circumstances whereby power devolved into the hands of numerous middle managers who had unmitigated power and little to no accountability. In response to the assertion that workers are also free under at-will employment to quit whenever they choose, Anderson points out that this does not actually constitute a check on abuse of power by managers, since the manager retains their position of power in the event a worker decides to leave, and the negative effects on the worker of their departure will be far greater than any negative effects on the company. Despite numerous reforms to labor laws, including provisions for protections of union activity, workers still remain protected under only a very narrow set of circumstances, and by and large are forced to cede the majority of their rights to the employer or risk harm to themselves and their families if they choose to leave.

Finally, Anderson arrives at her main point: the methods by which those under private government can advance and protect their liberties. She identifies only four main avenues which workers have to protect themselves and advance their liberties: exit, the rule of law, substantive constitutional rights, and voice. Exit is the right of workers to leave their place of employment, and while it seems acceptable to a casual observer, the difficulty of seeking out new employment is made all the more challenging by the realities of ineligibility to receive severance pay or unemployment, non-compete clauses which are becoming more popular even in non-technical fields, and the untold financial strain on those who would be most directly affected (spouses, children) if they left their job. The rule of law gives employees legal recourse in the event that their employer does something which is overtly illegal or discriminatory; however this is also problematic because it places responsibility on the employee to prove in court that they have been wronged, usually at great personal cost. Constitutional rights refers not only to legislative and judicial protections of the rights of workers, but also to the obligation of companies on Anderson’s account to articulate to their workers the policies, protections, and processes for redress to which employees are entitled. While many companies go to great lengths to codify and publicize their policies, they generally still have very wide latitude within the confines of the law to control and discourage certain activities (such as attempts at unionization) at their discretion. Finally, Anderson comes to the avenue of “voice,” whereby employee empowerment through joint governance of a firm allows all workers a voice in how things are done. She holds up the German model of employee/management codetermination as one promising example.

Personally, I found Anderson’s account of the tyrannical nature of some employers to be extremely personally relatable. Having served ten years in the US Navy, I can personally attest to Anderson’s quote that “private governments impose a far more minute, exacting, and sweeping regulation of employees than democratic states do in any domain outside of prisons and the military.” (p.112) I was at one point subject to the arbitrary whims of a ship Captain who evoked images of Captain Bligh, and at another time to an even more petty supervisor with whom I had personality conflicts. This petty supervisor ultimately accused me of arbitrary violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and because he outranked me it was impossible to defend myself without also being accused of insubordination. I was brought before a disciplinary hearing, summarily reduced in rank, and confined to military quarters for thirty days. This experience taught me that, while the military is ostensibly a meritocracy, there are in fact many examples of petty tyranny where a person who is granted a modicum of power and autonomy with little to no accountability may wield it abusively with virtual impunity.

While in the civilian world this level of absolute control over employees is rare, in some sense the financial burden of supporting a family provides and even more compelling incentive to submit to arbitrary and abusive supervisors, for fear of the ramifications of losing not only one’s income, but potentially health insurance, retirement, and other benefits as well. There are innumerable cases of single-parent workers who are forced to take low-paying jobs under poor working conditions merely for the sake of day-to-day survival for their children. These represent some of the most vulnerable elements of the workforce, and without basic enforcement of their legal rights they can be and often are subjected to all manner of harassing or discriminatory treatment simply because an employer knows they don’t realistically have the option to quit.

Unions and labor laws provide some manner of protection in this area; however as Anderson mentions the practical likelihood of taking one’s employer to court is almost unthinkable for the average minimum-wage worker (p. 116). Though labor reform has come a long way in the decades since it was first introduced, there are still many cases where workers lack the adequate resources to ensure their rights are protected. Anecdotally, I can also describe how my mother was effectively forced out of her teaching career at a public elementary school after 15 years of teaching because her union failed to adequately represent her, whether due to lack of funding or mere bureaucratic apathy, in a dispute against her school principal. While unionized labor does have its undeniable benefits, the protections it offers will likely never match the financial and legal resources of corporate employers. Until a method is devised whereby employees have the same right to legal representation as a person accused of a crime, it is unlikely that many of the most vulnerable employees, union or not, will have the de facto legal protections they are offered de jure.

With regard to promotion and advancement, I believe that it is also necessary to codify a requirement for employers to publish their criteria and selection processes for employee promotion. This is one concrete method of overcoming the perception of favoritism and special treatment within a workplace.  I believe the military has done better in this area to a certain extent, in the sense that there is a documented set of instructions for the annual performance evaluation process. Unfortunately, this system (at least in Navy practice) is not used for selection to the senior enlisted paygrades, where a much more secretive and opaque system is guarded by an in-group desperately clinging to antiquated traditions.

Critics of my position may argue that unfettered access to legal counsel by employees would lead to numerous frivolous lawsuits, or that most workplaces do not engage in the kind of arbitrary tyranny and exploitation of vulnerable workers that Anderson and I describe. To the first charge, I would argue that the laws guarding against frivolous torts are already well established, as are the laws for perjury. Secondly, according to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data for FY17, there were over 84,000 reported cases of EEO violations in the US last year, so this problem is hardly isolated. Furthermore, in a workplace where truly abusive and retributive behavior is the norm, it is even less likely that workers would feel empowered to report these abuses through a company grievance process, making it necessary to offer them the means to raise the case outside the standard channels.
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Though detractors may still complain that modern labor laws have essentially “solved” the issue of abuses which may be inflicted by private governments, I contend along with Anderson that true empowerment of laborers through joint decision making and greater accountability of supervisors is eminently necessary in order to protect the rights of employees from encroachment by their employers. Furthermore, with regard to Anderson’s four methods of ensuring the protection and advancement of worker’s interests, I believe that while exit, rule of law, and constitutional protections are indeed viable and necessary methods of securing workers’ rights, ultimately the democratization of decision making and increased transparency and accountability on the part of supervisors is the most crucial aspect of labor reform which as yet remains largely untouched by present efforts.

​Stock repurchasing was a major problem almost immediately after the TARP bailouts were handed out in 2009. Rather than use the free money they were given by the government to save themselves from insolvency, most corporations used their giant sums of cash to buy back large shares of their own stock, driving up the value of the remaining shares and increasing the P/E ratios of their stocks. This in turn led to an increase in overall stock market values as the increased valuation of the shares of major companies began to take the market higher. Unfortunately, these buybacks did nothing to increase the actual revenues of the companies, and merely served as a kind of artificial inflation of the company's (and in turn the shareholders') value.

This practice is still widely used today, because free loans at zero percent interest make it extremely easy to get cash on short notice and buy back stocks when your company's shares aren't performing as well as you'd like them to. Unfortunately, this does nothing to create new jobs or increase revenues for the company, it simply makes them look richer on paper.

Derivatives were largely invented in the 80's, back when Ronald Reagan first installed the relatively unknown and highly libertarian Alan Greenspan as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan in those days was largely opposed to government intervention in financial markets (which is why Reagan loved him), and therefore Greenspan chose to pass on any meaningful opportunity to control or push for legislation on the derivatives market. After the crash of 1987, Greenspan felt forced to embrace looser, more interventionist policies. This newer, looser attitude by the Fed is what effectively allowed the dot-com bubble of the 90's to flourish, and what eventually forced a concerned Greenspan to speak up in '96. After he was promptly shouted into silence, he resigned himself to his now-unavoidable policy of easing and subsequent intervention, which led to the coining of the phrase "the Greenspan Put" to describe the safety net which investors relied upon when engaging in their highly unsound business practices.

As time went on and the dot-com bubble burst, Greenspan came to the rescue with what would become the first of many government bailout programs. By the time he was replaced by George W. Bush with Ben Bernanke, the bailout policy for companies and banks considered "too big to fail" was already well established. This same bailout program would then be driven into overdrive by Bernanke (and his newest successor Janet Yellen) with the advent of the TARP bailouts and Quantitative Easing rounds 1 through 3.

Though these policies of easing are not directly tied to the derivatives market, one could easily argue that the derivatives market, which has been grossly overvalued due to its unregulated nature, has increased our economy's vulnerability (and therefore its need for rescue) when stocks, bonds, commodities, and other underlying assets go down, since one dollar's worth of underlying assets could be sustaining potentially thousands of dollars worth of derivatives.

Too Big To Fail, or TBTF as it is sometimes abbreviated, is the idea that certain companies, banks, and even governments, cannot be allowed to simply go bankrupt because of the irreparable damage that would cause to our national and global economy. While I don't deny that some banks are vitally important to our global economy, the idea that a company, bank, or government can be labeled as such gives them certain advantages in the marketplace which can, in effect, encourage unsound business practices.

What I mean by this is that, if a bank, government, or company knows that they will never be allowed to fail even under the worst circumstances, it may encourage them to take on far more debt than they could ever reasonably expect to pay off, simply because they trust that others will bail them out when the debt load becomes unmanageable.

The problem with the financial crisis of 2008 is that, when the government bailed out all the insolvent companies that were considered TBTF, we effectively nationalized all of the toxic debts which those companies were carrying, putting trillions of dollars onto the government's ledger which we knew we would probably never be able to pay off.

While the government does have the unique ability to print more money out of thin air to pay its own debts, eventually this can lead to the kinds of stymied economic growth and inflationary stagnation which we are currently seeing in our national and global economy. Furthermore, whereas companies and banks can rely on their TBTF status to secure loans from the government when they inevitably collapse, the government's only hope to raise more money comes in pretty much two forms: raise taxes, or sell more bonds. Selling bonds works when other countries and banks are willing to buy them, but what if the government crosses the threshold where it owes more money than its entire GDP? Will the world still place faith in the bonds of a government that is slowly going the way of Japan, who is currently sitting at roughly 250% debt-to-GDP ratio and whose currency is currently trading at a 120-1 exchange rate with the dollar and 134-1 with the Euro?

So selling bonds requires faith in the government that issues them, and that faith is highly dependent on a country's apparent ability to repay all of its debts. On the other hand, they could always just raise taxes again, right???

Luka Sulic and Stjepan Hauser are two world-class cello players from Croatia who are both classically trained and also famously good at producing some great modern covers on the cello.


Born and raised in war-torn Croatia, they met at a musical conservatory and began playing together about ten years ago. The partnership and friendship which the two men have formed over their mutual love of music is readily apparent in the way they play.


While I could recommend any number of wonderful pieces of their music to you, I think I'll offer you one of their funnier renditions...

The deeper philosophical lesson which I find in their work is the simple observation that incredible talent is made infinitely more appealing by the addition of some levity into one's craft.

All in all, it was an excellent adventure. The spontaneity of the day was what made it so exquisitely fun. We literally stopped at almost whatever we could find on our phones or by word of mouth from locals.

After it ended, we drove home late and night, and passed out at our homes, exhausted but very happy.

If you're currently leading a life of quiet desperation, you should consider doing something spontaneous and adventuresome with your friends as soon as possible. The journey is only as fun as the company you keep, and the plans you make should be wide open to the possibility of diversions and detours.

Life is too short to do only what's expected. Get out and live.

It would be nice to think the era of ruthless "Robber Barons" ended with the death of such greats as J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, but it seems that may be a bit too idealistic. The least we can do is complain, right?

I hope you'll take time to share this with as many people as you can, since it truly does affect us all.

Simply put, Putin wanted to keep Syria under his control, because it provides him with a valuable ally (or political pawn, depending on one's perspective) in the Middle East who can counteract the perceived US-puppet state of Israel. Obviously US-Israeli relations aren't quite as amorous these days as Putin may believe, but I digress...

When the Ukrainian situation erupted just two months later, it was widely speculated in pro-Russian circles that the unrest was fueled by Western-backed dissenters who were likely receiving help from outside sources (the implication being the CIA was involved), since America had an axe to grind after Putin embarrassed us with the Syria deal. Ukraine is strategically crucial to Russia, not only because of the Russian military bases in Crimea, but also because the vast majority of Russian oil exports to Western Europe travel through Ukrainian pipelines. While it will never be definitively proved that the US has had any involvement with the Ukrainian civil unrest (or the Syrian opposition movement, for that matter), it doesn't seem altogether illogical to make the leap that yes, we were in fact stirring up trouble in both Syria and Ukraine.

Fast forward to February of this year, when our President began stepping up his rhetoric on Ukraine, opening the door for yet another opportunity for the US to get involved in political affairs in Russia's backyard. It's no secret that these two men have a mutual disdain for one another, and I'm forced to wonder if perhaps the President was attempting to force a confrontation in some kind of quest for justice after the Syrian embarrassment.

When Putin responded by raising the stakes with troop deployments, Obama responded asymmetrically with his threats of economic sanctions. The critical mistake there was assuming that a Russian would have any respect for a non-military reaction (hint: he didn't). Viewing the sanctions as a minor inconvenience at best, Putin opted to again raise the stakes with increased military activity in the Pacific. At this point, Obama was faced with a critical choice: either man up and play Putin's game on a military scale, or fold under pressure. It seems to me that he chose the latter.

Last week, the Syrian opposition forces in Homs (their longest-held stronghold in Northern Syria) withdrew, and less than 24 hours later Putin drastically altered his tone on the subject of Ukraine. Again, while it will never be proven that the US has had any material involvement in the Syrian Opposition (other than a PR visit by Sen. John McCain) it stands to reason that the collapse of Syrian Opposition in their biggest stronghold, followed by an immediate relaxation of rhetoric on Putin's part, suggests that an unspoken deal was reached whereby we abandon our interests in Syria, and Putin stands down on his plan to annex more of Ukraine.

To some, this could arguably be called effective diplomacy. In my mind though, as I'm sure in Putin's, this marks yet another victory for Mother Russia. Not only did he get to keep his Middle East pawn, he also ripped some very lucrative chunks off of his former Soviet vassal-state in exchange for the US simply avoiding the possibility of either a costly military conflict or further international embarrassment.

This is what happens when a one-term Senator tries to play political chess with a man who spent 16 years in the KGB.

I attended a Greg Laswell concert a few weeks ago, and was lucky enough to also get a chance to meet him after the show. Greg is an awesome musician who also hails from the SoCal region, and the guy is hilarious in concert (seriously, he could've been a comedian). My first opportunity to hear him play live was actually several years ago at the San Diego County Fair ( better known to locals asThe Del Mar Fair). Like most people who live in SoCal, his style is very chill. His themes vary from heartbreak and sadness (his first album came out while he was getting a divorce) to persevering through hardship, finding love, and ultimately just living life and enjoying yourself. He has since gotten remarried, and his latest albums reflect a much happier Greg.

Greg has been through a lot of ups and downs in his relatively short musical career, but nevertheless he has always maintained his super-chill style and his down-to-earth geniality. His journey has been cataloged by each of his successive albums, and this has allowed all of his followers to kind of "grow with him" through the process. Whether you're happily involved with someone, or wallowing in the misery of a recent breakup, or even just enjoying some of the more happy-go-lucky moments of life, this guy's got an album for you.